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I. INTRODUCTION
“Can we ever get away from the sprawl?”1 This question has concerned
American city leaders for decades.2 Municipal annexation—the expansion
of city boundaries—helps to combat the devastating effects caused by
suburban flight and sprawl.3 Beginning in the early 1900s, Texas cities had
broad annexation authority4 and many utilized this power to develop into
the flourishing metropolises that they are today.5 Annexation is a
contentious issue though, and ignites property owners and their state

1. ARCADE FIRE, Sprawl II (Mountains Beyond Mountains), on THE SUBURBS (Merge Records 2010).
2. See Eric S. Raymond & Charles E. Menifield, A Tale of Two Cities: An Exploratory Study of
Consolidation and Annexation Policies in the Cities of Memphis and Nashville, 35 PUB. ADMIN. Q. 404, 418
(2011) (“[O]ver the past half century, central cities have faced increasing loss of its middle- to
upper-income residents . . . .”).
3. See id. (identifying annexation as a way for cities to “curb [the] ever-growing urban crisis”
caused by losing residents). The question of whether annexation is the best way to relieve municipal
financial burdens is a complex question that is outside the scope of this comment. See Robert Rivard,
City Counsel to Grapple Anew With Annexation Question, RIVARD REP. (June 10, 2016),
https://therivardreport.com/city-council-to-grapple-anew-with-annexation-question/
[https://
perma.cc/M37Z-D96R], for an example of financial analysis reports evaluating annexation plans in
Bexar County.
4. Compare Act approved April 7, 1913, 33d Leg., R.S., ch. 147, § 4, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 307,
310–16 (repealed 1995) (providing a historic account of the broad authority of home rule cities to
extend their boundaries), with TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 43.003 (designating three permissible
actions available to home rule cities regarding their boundaries).
5. See TEX. MUN. LEAGUE, HOW CITIES WORK 35 (2017), https://www.tml.org/p/
HowCitiesWork2017Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LH3-279D] (“States in which city councils decide
whether to annex have seen their cities grow faster over the past [twenty-five] years, both economically
and demographically, than other states that limit annexation.”). Over a fifty-year period, Houston
increased by 440 square miles, San Antonio by 381 square miles, Dallas by 229 square miles, and Austin
by 265 square miles. Id.
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representatives.6 This controversy is reflected in the evolution of Texas
annexation laws, which have been a continuous “balance of powers between
property owners and municipalities”7 with property owners given more
influence over time.8 The fight to erode broad municipal annexation
authority in Texas came to an end during the eighty-fifth legislative session
with the passing of the Municipal Annexation Right to Vote Act
(MARVA).9
Under the new law in Texas, cities located in populous counties are
severely limited in their ability to annex neighboring communities.10 This
victory for private property rights may seem like good news for Texans
living in fringe communities who are now safeguarded from paying cityimposed property taxes. However, the new law goes against urban
researchers’ recommendations11 and may lead to detrimental financial
consequences for municipalities, metropolitan regions, and the entire State
of Texas.12 Although there are other tools available to help cities improve
and maintain their security, Texas lawmakers will likely jeopardize the
economic prosperity of Texas if they continue to strip away local
government powers.13
6. See id. at 34 (“Rural landowners and others have regularly turned to their legislators for relief
from city expansions, with the result that bills to curb unilateral annexations have surfaced in every
session for the past [forty] years.”).
7. H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE,
84th Leg., R.S., at 71 (2016).
8. See, e.g., Act of May 25, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 1167, § 4, sec. 43.052(c), 1999 Tex. Gen.
Laws 4074, 4075 (codified at TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 43.052(c)) (requiring cities to wait three years
before annexing an area).
9. See Municipal Annexation Right to Vote Act, 85th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 6, §§ 56–57, sec. 43,
2017 Tex. Gen. Laws 4505, 4526 (codified at TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 43) (reforming municipal
annexation laws).
10. See id. §§ 24–26, secs. 43.066–.0699, 4511–17 (requiring tier 2 municipalities to obtain
consent from residents and property owners prior to annexation).
11. See, e.g., DAVID RUSK, BROOKINGS INST. METRO. POLICY PROGRAM, ANNEXATION AND
THE FISCAL FATE OF CITIES 11 (2006), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/
2016/06/20060810_fateofcities.pdf [https://perma.cc/V367-C249] (“State legislatures should have a
vital interest in ensuring the fiscal viability of their state’s municipalities, particularly their major cities.”).
12. See PERRYMAN GRP., THE IMPACT OF OVERLY RESTRICTIVE ANNEXATION POLICY ON
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN TEXAS AND ITS METROPOLITAN REGIONS 16, 21–22 (2003),
https://www.tml.org/p/2003PerrymanReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/YHX2-54FP] (predicting
severe legislative restrictions on municipal annexation will cost the State of Texas “$305.7 billion in
yearly gross product, $168.8 billion in annual personal income, and 1,234,760 permanent jobs” over a
thirty-year period).
13. See Richard Parker, Opinion, The Texas Economic Miracle Is Over, DALL. MORNING NEWS
(Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.dallasnews.com/opinion/commentary/2017/03/28/texas-economic-
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This comment begins by giving a background on municipal annexation
in the United States and Texas, in Part II. Part III and IV discuss the
legislative history and specific provisions of MARVA. Part V predicts the
future implications related to annexation reform including cautioning state
lawmakers from creating further restrictions on local government authority.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Municipal Annexation in the United States
Municipal annexation occurs when cities expand their boundaries and
thereby increase in land area.14 Cities choose to acquire additional territory
for a number of reasons,15 but the greatest motivator is maintaining and
improving economic prosperity.16 Annexation was frequently used by
American cities in the twentieth century,17 and is oftentimes a controversial
issue for the communities being annexed.18 Involuntary municipal
miracle [https://perma.cc/CS97-JJ3Z] (asserting the “Texas Miracle” is overdue largely to state
legislators’ preoccupation with issues other than the economy).
14. Christopher J. Tyson, Annexation and the Mid-Size Metropolis: New Insights in the Age of Mobile
Capital, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 505, 509 (2012).
15. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS
LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 48 (2016) (“The purpose of annexation by municipalities is to create
zoning and development standards, provide more efficient public safety and municipal services.”);
PAULA F. STEINBAUER ET AL., AN ASSESSMENT OF MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION IN GEORGIA AND
THE UNITED STATES: A SEARCH FOR POLICY GUIDANCE 8–9 (Richard W. Campbell ed., 2002)
(identifying “control [of] urban sprawl” and “broadening their political base” as potential motivations
behind a municipality’s decision to annex).
16. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS
LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 48 (Tex. 2016) (“[A]nnexation gives municipalities the ability to
maximize the return on investments (infrastructure and business incentives), protect and expand the
tax base.”); Tyson, supra note 14, at 507 (recognizing that cities want to grow in size because it usually
leads to “better employment opportunities . . . and higher property values”); Christopher J. Tyson,
Localism and Involuntary Annexation: Reconsidering Approaches to New Regionalism, 87 TUL. L. REV. 297, 300
(2012) (discussing how municipal annexation allows cities to recapture taxes from wealthier residents
who emigrated to the edge of the city boundaries).
17. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 140 (1985) (“Without exception, the adjustment of local boundaries has been the
dominant method of population growth in every American city of consequence.”); Mary M. Edwards,
Understanding the Complexities of Annexation, 23 J. PLAN. LITERATURE 119, 119–20 (2008) (summarizing
statistics indicating that from 1990–2005, cities in America annexed around 4.6 million acres of land
and over 1 million people).
18. See 22 DAVID B. BROOKS, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: MUNICIPAL LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 1.13 (2d ed. 2017) (“The unilateral annexation of territory by cities without voter approval is one of
the more contentious issues of municipal law in Texas.”); Tyson, supra note 16, at 300 (noting there is
“organized opposition” experienced in states that give cities broad annexation authority).
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annexation,19 the process of cities annexing “without the consent of the
residents or property owners in the annexed area[,]” is an especially
contentious subject.20
State law primarily dictates municipal annexation.21 Thus, each state has
developed a unique form of annexation policy.22 Due to the myriad of state
annexation procedures, it is best to examine these variations through general
classifications.23 The method used by most states requires voter approval
from either the residents of the annexing municipality, the area potentially
being annexed, or both.24 A method commonly employed by states in the
New England area25 involves special legislative acts to approve boundary
changes.26 A process used by states in the middle and far west27 requires
state administrative agencies or boards to approve annexation plans.28
19. Involuntary annexation is also called “forced” and “unilateral” annexation. Tyson, supra
note 16, at 300.
20. Id.
21. Tyson, supra note 14, at 511 (“Annexation laws are not controlled by the federal
government . . . .”). While annexation is mostly under the authority of states, the U.S. Supreme Court
helped shape the foundation of the issue. In Hunter v. City of Pittsburg, the Supreme Court declared:
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the [s]tate . . . . The [s]tate, therefore, at its
pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property,
hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole
or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this
may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against
their protest.
Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907) (emphasis added); see also Holt Civic Club v.
City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 61–63 (1975) (upholding a state law granting municipalities power to
regulate communities in the extraterritorial area).
22. See Jaime L. Palmer & Greg Lindsey, Classifying State Approaches to Annexation, 33 ST. & LOC.
GOV’T R. 60, 60 (2001) (“[N]o two states provide for precisely the same procedures.”).
23. See generally id. (detailing the various types of annexation policy).
24. See Dustin Cammack, Comment, Municipal Manifest Destiny: Constitutionality of Unilateral
Municipal Annexations, 2013 BYU L. REV. 619, 622 (2013) (“Under a system of popular determination,
some combination of residents of the annexing municipality, the annexation area, and the local
government from which the annexation area will be taken . . . vote directly to approve the
annexation.”); see also Palmer & Lindsey, supra note 22, at 69 (analyzing data that shows more than half
of the states use some type of popular determination as the main method for approving annexations).
25. See Palmer & Lindsey, supra note 22, at 69 (“Legislative determination is used most often
in . . . New England or eastern states . . . .”).
26. See Cammack, supra note 24, at 622–23 (discussing “Legislative Determination”).
27. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part 1—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 82 (1990).
28. See Cammack, supra note 24, at 623 (“In a quasi-legislative jurisdiction, the state legislature
delegates its power to approve or initiate boundary changes to an administrative agency, independent
board, or non-judicial tribunal.”).
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Another scheme, albeit rarely used, utilizes a panel of judges to authorize
annexation proposals.29 The last general annexation method used by states,
and the most liberal one, is involuntary annexation.30
Involuntary annexation has been employed primarily by states in the
Sunbelt region,31 including the State of Texas.32 Despite the predominate
use of involuntary annexation in the past,33 state legislatures have
increasingly given residents and property owners greater control over the
annexation process.34 In 2010, states that allowed some form of annexation
without consent included North Carolina,35 Indiana,36 Kansas,37
Nebraska,38 Tennessee,39 Texas,40 Delaware,41 and Idaho.42 By the end
of 2017, three of these states passed legislation severely restricting the use
of involuntary annexation.43 This trend is largely due to the efforts of
29. See id. at 624 (discussing the state of Virginia’s “three-judge panel to approve annexations”);
see also Palmer & Lindsey, supra note 22, at 69 (“Judicial determination is the main method in only [one]
state . . . .”).
30. See Cammack, supra note 24, at 624 (“A few states give broad annexation powers to
municipal governments, allowing them to freely annex . . . all with little or no involvement by annexed
residents, landowners, or their elected representatives.”).
31. See Briffault, supra note 27, at 80 (“[M]uch of the population growth of the large cities of the
Sunbelt in recent decades is a result of substantial territorial expansion attributable to the liberal
annexation laws of those states.”).
32. See id. at 80 n.339 (“In the postwar period, Texas has led all states in population and land
area annexed.”).
33. See Tyson, supra note 14, at 511 (“Forcible annexation was the predominant doctrine in the
states during the nineteenth century.”).
34. See Palmer & Lindsey, supra note 22, at 69–71 (concluding state legislatures have decreased
municipalities’ ability to annex without consent and have “increased opportunities for property owners
to affect or control the outcome of annexation proposals”).
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 160A-46 (2010) (repealed 2011).
36. IND. CODE ANN. § 36-4-3-3 (2011).
37. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-520 (2011).
38. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-117 (2011).
39. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-51-102 (2011) (current version at TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-51-102
(2015)).
40. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 43.
41. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 101 (2011).
42. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-222 (2011).
43. North Carolina changed its laws in 2011. See 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 396 (reforming
involuntary annexation laws). The Tennessee General Assembly passed involuntary annexation reform
legislation in 2014. See 2014 Tenn. Pub. Acts 707 (repealing unilateral, nonconsensual annexation).
Tennessee lawmakers took the anti-forced annexation campaign a step further by introducing a
de-annexation bill in 2017. See S. 641, 110th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2017) (proposing
legislation that would allow residents living in areas already annexed to petition for de-annexation).
The Texas legislature passed involuntary annexation reform in 2017. See Municipal Annexation Right
to Vote Act, 85th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 6, §§ 56–57, sec. 43, 2017 Tex. Gen. Laws 4505, 4526 (codified at

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol50/iss2/5

6

Bell: Municipal Annexation Reform in Texas

2019]

COMMENT

717

citizens and communities fighting against involuntary annexation,44
claiming the process violates the basic principal of self-determination,45
amounts to taxation without representation,46 and infringes on private
property rights.47
B. Initial Development of Municipal Annexation Laws in Texas
Under the Republic of Texas and later under the State of Texas,48 cities
formed and derived power through legislative acts.49 This limitation on
municipal authority meant cities had to obtain legislative approval to extend
their boundaries.50 Texas municipalities were granted some authority in
1858 when the legislature gave cities the ability to incorporate without a
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 43) (amending the prior statute and reforming involuntary municipal
annexation). Although it appears that Indiana cities can still annex without consent, there are now
stricter procedural requirements. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 36-4-3-5.1 (West 2011) (detailing the
requirements of notices to the public).
44. See Tyson, supra note 16, at 300 (claiming all states allowing involuntary annexation “are
facing some level of organized opposition”); see also Tyson, supra note 14, at 520 (“Annexation is now
widely perceived as a threat to individual liberty and autonomous self-government, pitting metropolitan
region residents against metropolitan region central city governments.”).
45. See HON. JESS FIELDS & JAMES QUINTERO, TEX. PUB. POLICY FOUND., ENDING FORCED
ANNEXATION IN TEXAS 9–10 (2015), https://www.texaspolicy.com/library/doclib/ending-forcedannexation-in-texas.pdf [https://perma.cc/ERZ6-VLWP] (arguing individuals have a right to decide
which government they live under).
46. See Harris v. City of Hous., 151 F.3d 186, 191–92 (5th Cir. 1998) (DeMoss, J., dissenting)
(claiming the involuntary annexation of the Kingwood community violated the fundamental principal
of “no taxation without representation”).
47. See FIELDS & QUINTERO, supra note 45, at 15–16 (arguing annexation is a form of
regulatory taking); Tyson, supra note 16, at 327 (describing the belief held by some “that one is entitled
to have their property located in a particular municipal jurisdiction and . . . infringement of that right
through the adjustment of municipal boundaries is akin to an infringement of vested rights in private
property”).
48. Texas was admitted into the United States in 1845. S.J. Res. 1, 29th Cong., 9 Stat. 108 (1846)
(enacted).
49. See Brown v. City of Galveston, 75 S.W. 488, 495 (Tex. 1903) (“In [Texas] the doctrine is
well settled that a municipal corporation can exist only by and through an act of the [l]egislature of the
[s]tate, and that it has no power not granted by the charter, and can have no officer not provided for
by law.” (citing Blessing v. City of Galveston, 42 Tex. 641, 657–58 (1874); Pye v. Peterson, 45 Tex. 312
(1876); Vosburg v. McCrary, 14 S.W. 195 (1890))); see also Scott Houston, Municipal Annexation: A Key
Remedy for “Reverse Intergovernmental Aid”, 15 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 329, 342 (2014) (“[T]he legislature
passed a bill . . . that incorporated a city and delineated its powers and duties.”).
50. Maddrey v. Cox, 11 S.W. 541, 542 (Tex. 1889) (recognizing the power of the legislature to
“extend the boundaries of an existing corporation, without the consent, or even against the remonstrance,
of a majority or all the inhabitants of the existing corporation or of the territory to be annexed”
(emphasis added)). As demonstrated in Maddrey, involuntary annexation has deep roots in Texas. Id.
at 542–43.
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special legislative act51 and the power to expand their boundaries if residents
of the proposed annexed area petitioned to be included in the city.52
The Home Rule Amendment of 191253 led to a major shift in annexation
authority.54 This constitutional amendment granted “[c]ities having more
than five thousand . . . inhabitants” the power to “adopt or amend their
charters” so long as they are not inconsistent with the general laws or
constitution.55 The following year, the legislature passed a law granting
specific powers to home rule cities,56 including the power to extend
boundary lines.57 Annexation authority given to home rule cities by the
1913 Act was essentially unrestricted58 and allowed annexation of any
51. Act approved Jan. 27, 1858, 7th Leg., R.S., ch. 61, §§ 1–9, 1858 Tex. Gen. Laws 69, 69–70,
reprinted in 4 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822–1897, at 941, 941–42 (Austin: Gammel Book Co.
1898).
52. Robert R. Ashcroft & Barbara Kyle Balfour, Home Rule Cities and Municipal Annexation in
Texas: Recent Trends and Future Prospects, 15 ST. MARY’S L.J. 519, 521 (1984) (“Under the general laws
cities were granted the right to annex territory without obtaining the permission of the [l]egislature only
when . . . a majority of the qualified electors of the territory to be annexed indicated their desire to be
included in the municipality.”).
53. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
54. See Ashcroft & Balfour, supra note 52, at 522 (“[T]he legislative powers were taken from the
[l]egislature and given directly to home rule cities by the constitution.”). Other states experienced
similar trends due to criticism over the Dillion theory that municipalities should only have the power
specifically granted to them by state legislatures and statutes. See FIELDS & QUINTERO, supra note 45,
at 5 (discussing Iowa Supreme Court Justice John Forrest Dillion’s “legal theory that localities should
wield no more authority than that specifically delegated to them by state statutes”).
55. TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a); see also id. § 5 interp. commentary (West 2007) (explaining the
Home Rule Amendment of 1912).
56. Act approved April 7, 1913, 33d Leg., R.S., ch. 147, §§ 1–10, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 307,
310–17 (repealed 1995). There are three basic types of municipalities in Texas: general law, home rule,
and special law. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 5.001–.005. The formation and functions of general
law cities are “pursuant to legislation” and not a city charter that is specific to the municipality.
BROOKS, supra note 18, § 3.03. Home rule cities are those that “operate under a municipal charter that
has been adopted or amended as authorized by Article XI, Section 5, of the Texas Constitution.” TEX.
LOC. GOV’T § 5.004. Special law cities “are those created by discreet acts of the legislature.” BROOKS,
supra note 18, § 3.03. General law and special-law cities’ authority to annex was mostly unchanged by
MARVA, and so home rule cities are the focus of this comment. See Municipal Annexation Right to
Vote Act, 85th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 6, §§ 1–57, sec. 43, 2017 Tex. Gen. Laws 4505, 4505–26 (codified at
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 43).
57. Act approved April 7, 1913, ch. 147, § 4, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 307, 310.
58. See Trueman O’Quinn, Annexing New Territory: A Review of Texas Law and the Proposals for
Legislative Control of Cities Extending Their Boundaries, 39 TEX. L. REV. 172, 174–75 (1960) (discussing
annexation laws prior to the Municipal Annexation Act of 1963 as providing cities with the ability to
“extend[ ] their corporate limits, without legislative standards, restraints, or limitations”); FIELDS &
QUINTERO, supra note 45, at 5 (claiming cities that adopted home-rule charters had “virtually no limit
whatsoever on the authority . . . to annex”).
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amount of land,59 any type of land,60 without notice to residents,61 and
without the consent of residents.62 Some commentators believe this overly
broad power led to land grabbing and other “annexation abuses”63 that
eventually gave rise to legislative action in the 1960s.64
C. Evolution of Modern Annexation Laws
Home rule cities had nearly unrestricted annexation authority until the
Municipal Annexation Act of 1963,65 which marked the beginning of a slow
but continuous trend chipping away at municipal annexation authority.66
Although home rule cities were still allowed to annex without consent, the
1963 Act “radically changed the authority and procedure” for annexing.67
The greatest change created by the 1963 Act was limiting annexation to
either a city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ)68 or city-owned property.69
Additional limitations included barring annexation of incorporated areas
within the ETJ,70 limits to the amount of land that can be annexed,71 and
the requirement that cities provide “governmental and proprietary services”
59. See Ashcroft & Balfour, supra note 52, at 525–26 (“Limitations were not imposed on the
amount of land that could be annexed . . . .”).
60. See Texas ex rel. Pan Am. Prod. Co. v. Tex. City, 303 S.W.2d 780, 782 (Tex. 1957) (restating
municipal authority to expand boundaries “without regard to the use or character of the occupation of
the annexed territory” (quoting State v. City of Waxahachie, 17 S.W. 348, 350 (Tex. 1891))).
61. Ashcroft & Balfour, supra note 52, at 525 (“No notice requirements or time limits were
imposed on home rule cities initiating the annexation process.”).
62. See O’Quinn, supra note 58, at 174 (discussing annexation laws prior to the Municipal
Annexation Act of 1963 as providing cities with the ability to annex “without consent of the residents
of the territory being annexed”).
63. Ashcroft & Balfour, supra note 52, at 523–24.
64. See id. at 526 (suggesting the Municipal Annexation Act of 1963 was passed “[i]n response
to annexation wars and to prevent such abuses from continuing”).
65. Municipal Annexation Act, 58th Leg., R.S., ch. 160, 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws 447, amended by
Act of Sept. 1, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 1077, § 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 3674, 3674–83.
66. See Ashcroft & Balfour, supra note 52, at 530 (asserting the Municipal Annexation Act of
1963 began the “process of restricting cities’ power to annex”).
67. BROOKS, supra note 18, § 1.13.
68. Extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) is defined as “the unincorporated area, not a part of any
other city, which is contiguous to the corporate limits of any city[.]” Municipal Annexation Act,
ch. 160, art. I, § 3(A), 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws 447, 447 (amended 1987). ETJs extend five miles or less
outside city boundaries. Id. at 447–48. As the city’s boundary expands, the ETJ “expand[s] in
conformity with such annexation and shall comprise an area around the new corporate limits[.].” Id.
at 448.
69. Id. § 7(A), at 450.
70. Id. § 3(A), at 447.
71. Id. § 7(B), at 450 (“A city may annex in any one calendar year only territory equivalent in
size to ten per cent (10%) of the total corporate area . . . .”).
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to the annexed area within three years of annexation that are “substantially
equivalent” to those services provided in other parts of the city.72
Municipalities were given some control over their ETJs,73 but they could
not impose taxes.74 Procedural changes created by the 1963 Act required a
public hearing prior to annexation, newspaper notice of the hearing, and
completion of annexation within ninety days of instituting the proceeding.75
After the passage of the Municipal Annexation Act of 1963, no significant
changes were made to cities’ annexation authority until the end of the
twentieth century.76 S.B. 89, passed by the Texas legislature in 1999,77
made significant changes to annexation law in response to Houston’s
involuntary annexation of a neighboring community.78 In 1996, the City of
Houston proposed to annex the Kingwood community located within the
city’s ETJ.79 Despite resistance from Kingwood residents,80 Houston’s
City Council voted to annex the community.81 After unsuccessful judicial
attempts to stop the annexation,82 S.B. 89 was introduced and subsequently

72. Id. § 10(A), at 452.
73. Cities could extend their subdivision ordinances to the ETJ area. Id. § 4, at 449. Cities also
had the power to designate an area as an “industrial district” and provide temporary exemption from
being annexed. Id. § 5, at 449. This industrial district designation was a tool used by cities to attract
new business and development into the ETJ. See Ashcroft & Balfour, supra note 52, at 529 (discussing
how the exemption of industrial districts “was effectively a tax abatement scheme”).
74. Municipal Annexation Act, ch. 160, art. I, § 3(D), 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws 447, 449.
75. Id. § 6, at 449–50.
76. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS
LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 48 (2016) (noting the Legislative act passed in 1999, S.B. 89, was “the
first comprehensive reform of the annexation laws [in Texas] since the Municipal Annexation Act of
1963”).
77. Act of May 25, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 1167, §§ 1–18, secs. 42–43, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws
4074 (amended 2017) (current version at TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE §§ 42–43).
78. See Tyson, supra note 16, at 320 (claiming the annexation of Kingwood “ultimately
precipitated a movement to change the state’s involuntary annexation provisions and a revision to the
annexation regime altogether”); Peter S. Canellos, Land Grab: Outraged Residents of Houston Suburb Fight
City’s Annexation, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 16, 1997), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-199708-16-9708160178-story.html [https://perma.cc/B8DS-C5UL] (“[H]undreds of Kingwood
homeowners showed up at the state capitol in Austin [to protest] . . . .”).
79. Harris v. City of Hous., 151 F.3d 186, 187 (5th Cir. 1998).
80. Kingwood residents resisted the annexation due to concerns over “increased taxation and a
decrease in the quality of municipal services.” Tyson, supra note 16, at 321. Some residents of Houston
also opposed the annexation “alleg[ing] that both the purpose and effect of the annexation were to
dilute the votes of minority residents[.]” Harris, 151 F.3d at 188.
81. Harris, 151 F.3d at 187.
82. Id. (vacating “the district court’s prior orders and remand[ing] with instructions to dismiss
the case as moot”).
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passed by the seventy-sixth legislature.83
Under S.B. 89, cities were required to prepare a proposal identifying the
areas to be annexed and wait three years before commencing the plan.84 In
addition to holding public hearings, cities were required to give written
notice to every property owner and service provider in the area.85 Cities
were also required to develop and publish a plan for extending full municipal
services to the annexed area.86 Another major hurdle for municipalities
under the amended law was the requirement of cities with less than
1.6 million people to negotiate with the annexed community over either the
services that would be provided after annexation or services in lieu of
annexation.87
Many initial supporters of S.B. 89 felt the final version of the bill was not
enough to protect property rights,88 and thus the fight to end involuntary
annexation continued.89 Legislators’ persistent efforts proved successful in
2017 when the eighty-fifth legislative session essentially ended involuntary
annexation in Texas.90
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION
RIGHT TO VOTE ACT
After the eighty-fourth legislative session, the Senate Committee on
Intergovernmental Relations and the House Committee on Land and
Resource Management issued interim charges addressing legislative
recommendations on annexation.91 Neither committee explicitly proposed
83. Act of May 25, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 1167, §§ 1–18, secs. 42–43, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws
4074 (amended 2017) (current version at TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 42–43).
84. Id. § 4, sec. 43.052(c), at 4075.
85. Id. § 4, sec. 43.052(f)(1)–(2), at 4076.
86. Id. § 7, sec. 43.056(a), at 4079–81.
87. Id. § 8, sec. 43.0562(a)(1), at 4083.
88. See Houston, supra note 49, at 344 (“After failing to limit annexation authority in 1999,
property rights advocates put on a full-court press during the 2003 legislative session . . . .”).
89. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS
LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 48 (2016) (stating Texas legislators made several attempts after S.B.89
“to amend municipal authority on annexation”); Houston, supra note 49, at 343 (“[B]ills to curb
annexations have surfaced in every session for the past fifty years.” (quoting Scott Houston, TEX.
MUN. LEAGUE, MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION IN TEXAS: “IS IT REALLY THAT COMPLICATED?” 6
(2012), https://www.tml.org/legal_pdf/ANNEXATION.pdf [https://perma.cc/U86J-7WMD])).
90. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 43.0671, .0681, .0691 (requiring cities in populous
counties to obtain consent prior to annexation of an area).
91. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS
LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 2 (2016) (requesting the committee “[e]xamine current regulatory
authority available to municipalities in their extraterritorial jurisdiction. Study current annexation
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voter approved annexations, but both recommended reforming the
annexation process in a way that gives citizens impacted by annexation more
power.92 Legislators of the eighty-fifth session responded to the
committees’ advice by introducing a bill reforming involuntary
annexation,93 but it was successfully filibustered by opponents in the final
hours of the regular session.94
A special session was called and municipal annexation reform was
included as one of several issues to be considered.95 S.B. 6, an annexation
reform bill similar to the regular session bill, passed in the senate.96 The
house made several changes to S.B. 6, including reducing the number of
cities significantly affected by the new law,97 reducing the time a city could

policies in Texas. Make necessary legislative recommendations to ensure a proper balance between
development, municipal regulations, and the needs of citizens in Texas”); S. COMM. ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th
Leg., R.S., at 2 (2016) (asking the committee to “[i]dentify areas of concern in regards to statutory
extraterritorial jurisdiction expansion and the processes used by municipalities for annexation,
specifically reviewing whether existing statute strikes the appropriate balance between safeguarding
private property rights and encouraging orderly growth and economic development”).
92. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS
LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 71 (2016) (recommending the legislature “[r]econsider annexation
reform[,] which will balance the powers between private property owners and municipalities”); S.
COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS
LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 6 (2016) (recommending the legislature “strengthen the annexation
process by encouraging greater citizen participation from those impacted by a proposed annexation
plan”). The recommendation for legislative action was a departure from previous years where
annexation was researched, but senate and house committees did not endorse changes in the law. H.
COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg.,
R.S., at 43–44 (2016).
93. Tex. S.B. 715, 85th Leg., R.S. (2017).
94. See Cassandra Pollock & Brandon Formby, Sen. Menéndez’s Filibuster Effectively Kills City
Annexation Bill, TEX. TRIB. (May 29, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/05/28/texas-senmenendez-begins-filibuster-county-annexation-bill/ [https://perma.cc/DH3C-SYQ5] (reporting on
Texas Senator José Menéndez successfully filibustering S.B. 715 due to the provision allowing cities to
regulate land around military bases being taken out of the bill).
95. See Bobby Blanchard, 20 Things Gov. Greg Abbott Wants Lawmakers to Address in a
Special Session, TEX. TRIB. (June 6, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/06/06/heres-all-20items-gov-greg-abbott-wants-lawmakers-address-special-ses/
[https://perma.cc/54XP-XX9A]
(listing “[m]unicipal annexation reform” as one of the several items legislators were to consider during
the special session).
96. S.J. of Tex., 85th Leg., 1st C.S. 285 (2017).
97. See H. Comm. on Land & Res. Mgmt., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 6, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017)
(changing the definition of a “tier 1 county” from a county “with a population of less than 125,000”
to “a population of less than 500,000”). The senate version of the bill, as it pertains to the requirement
of obtaining consent to annex, would have applied to twenty-three additional Texas counties. See
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begin the annexation process after an unsuccessful attempt,98 and giving
cities more authority over annexing land surrounding military bases.99
S.B. 6, named the Municipal Annexation Right to Vote Act (MARVA),100
was signed by the governor on August 15, 2017101 and took effect on
December 1, 2017.102
IV. THE MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION RIGHT TO VOTE ACT
MARVA amended Chapter 43 of the Texas Local Government Code103
and significantly reduced home rule cities’ annexation authority.104 Below
is a discussion of the key changes to annexation law created by MARVA.
A. Tier 1 and Tier 2 Municipality Definitions
MARVA adds “tier 1 county,” “tier 2 county,” “tier 1 municipality,” and
“tier 2 municipality” definitions to section 43.001 of the Local Government
Code, which designates a home rule city’s authority to annex.105 A “tier 1
county” is any county “with a population of less than 500,000[.]”106 A
“tier 2 county” is any county with a population over 500,000.107 A “tier 1
municipality” is a city located in one or more tier 1 counties that is annexing
an area located in a tier 1 county.108 A “tier 2 municipality” is any city
Population Estimates for Texas Counties, 2010-2017, TEX. ST. LIBR. & ARCHIVES COMMISSION,
https://www.tsl.texas.gov/ref/abouttx/popcnty201011.html [https://perma.cc/R77Y-RBKS].
98. See H. Comm. on Land & Res. Mgmt., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 6, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017)
(reducing the time period that a city must wait after an unsuccessful annexation attempt).
99. See id. (increasing annexation authority over the land area around military bases from a
quarter of a mile to five miles).
100. S. Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 6, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017).
101. Municipal Annexation Right to Vote Act, 85th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 6, § 57, 2017 Tex. Gen.
Laws 4505, 4526 (codified at TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 43).
102. Id.
103. The act also amended sections of the Special District Local Laws Code and repealed
section 5.701(n)(6) of the Water Code. Id. §§ 44–53, 55(c), at 4521–26 (codified at TEX. SPEC. DIST.
CODE §§ 8395.151–9039.110).
104. Id. § 3, sec. 43.003, at 4506 (codified at TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 43.003). Annexation
authority and procedures for general-law municipalities did not substantially change under the amended
law. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 43.023–.027, 43.032–.034 (relating to annexation authority
of general-law cities).
105. Municipal Annexation Right to Vote Act, ch. 6, § 1, sec. 43.001, 2017 Tex. Gen. Laws
4505, 4505–06.
106. Id. at 4505.
107. Id. Also included in the definition of a “tier 2 county” are counties of any size with “a
freshwater fisheries center operated by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department” and any tier 1 county
in which residents elect to be designated as a tier 2 county. Id.
108. Id.
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“wholly or partly located in a tier 2 county [ ] or wholly located in one or
more tier 1 counties that proposes to annex an area wholly or partially
located in a tier 2 county.”109 The annexation authority of a city designated
as a tier 1 municipality did not substantially change under MARVA.110
However, the annexation authority of a city designated as a tier 2
municipality changed considerably.111
B. Tier 2 Municipality Annexation Authority
MARVA created three main classifications of annexation authority and
procedures for tier 2 municipalities: annexation of an area based on request
of owners,112 annexation of an area with a population less than 200,113 and
annexation of an area with a population of more than 200.114 While the
procedure varies for all three categories, each one requires some form of
consent from the residents and property owners of the area proposed for
annexation.115 Consent is required not only for full annexations but also
for limited purpose annexations.116
C. Tier 2 Municipality Annexation on Request of Owners
Subchapter C–3 of Local Government Code Chapter 43 provides the
authority and procedures for annexing areas based on the request of
landowners.117 Tier 2 municipalities have the authority to “annex an area

109. Id. at 4505–06.
110. See id. §§ 12–14, secs. 43.0205, .0505, at 4508 (amending Subchapters B and C–1, Chapter
43 of the Local Government Code to apply only to tier 1 municipalities).
111. See id. §§ 24–26, sec. 43.066–.0699, at 4511–17 (creating new annexation requirements for
tier 2 municipalities by adding Subchapters C–2, C–3, C–4, and C–5 to Chapter 43 of the Local
Government Code).
112. Id. § 26, secs. 43.067–.0673, at 4512–13.
113. Id. § 26, secs. 43.068–.0688, at 4513–15.
114. Id. § 26, secs. 43.069–.0699, at 4515–17.
115. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 43.0671 (allowing tier 2 municipalities to annex “an
area if each owner of land in the area requests the annexation”); id. § 43.0681 (granting tier 2
municipalities the authority to annex an area with less than 200 people after obtaining consent through
a petition signed by a majority of registered voters in the area); id. § 43.0691 (requiring a tier 2
municipality to obtain consent through an election prior to annexation of an area with more than 200
people).
116. See id. §§ 43.121–.1211 (requiring tier 2 municipalities with more than 225,000 residents to
“annex an area for the limited purposes of applying its planning, zoning, health, and safety ordinances
in the area”).
117. Id. §§ 43.067–.0673. Sponsors of MARVA state one of the objectives of the bill was to
“reduce[ ] bureaucracy to expedite voluntary annexation when cities and land owners can agree on
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if each owner of land in the area requests the annexation.”118 Prior to
annexation under Subchapter C–3, the municipality must negotiate and
enter into a service agreement with landowners.119 The municipality must
also hold at least two public hearings before adopting an ordinance to annex
the area.120
D. Tier 2 Municipality Annexation of an Area with a Population Less Than 200
Subchapter C–4 of Local Government Code Chapter 43 provides the
authority and procedures for annexing areas with a population under
200.121 A tier 2 municipality may annex an area with a population of less
than 200 if consent is obtained through a petition signed by more than 50%
of registered voters of the area and more than 50% of land owners if
registered voters in the area do not own more than half of the area being
annexed.122 Prior to collecting signatures for the petition, the municipality
must adopt a resolution pertaining to the proposed annexation,123 mail
notice of the proposed annexation to “each resident and property
owner[,]”124 and conduct a public hearing.125
The municipality has five months to collect signatures from registered
voters and landowners.126 If the municipality fails to collect the requisite
number of signatures, then it is banned from proposing annexation of the
area for a year.127 If the municipality collects the requisite amount of

services.” S. Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 6, 85th Leg., 1st C.S., at 1 (2017).
Subchapter C–3 appears to be the legislators’ attempt to accomplish this objective.
118. TEX. LOC. GOV’T § 43.0671 (emphasis added). Subchapter C–3 does not address how
landowners make the request. Id. §§ 43.067–.0673.
119. Id. § 43.0672.
120. Id. § 43.0673. The municipality must also provide notice of the public hearings. Id.
§ 43.0673(d).
121. Id. §§ 43.068–.0688.
122. See id. §§ 43.068–.0681 (declaring additional consent from land owners is not required if
the registered voters in the area own at least 50% of the land to be annexed).
123. Id. § 43.0682. Resolutions must include the intent to annex, a map of the area that will be
annexed, and a list and schedule of services that will be provided to the area by the municipality. Id.
124. Id. § 43.0683. Notices must be mailed no later than seven days after adopting the
resolution. Id.
125. Id. § 43.0684. At least one public hearing must be held within twenty-one to thirty days
after adopting the resolution. Id.
126. Id. § 43.0685. The municipality has 180 days from the adoption of the resolution but
cannot begin collecting signatures until after notices have been mailed and the first public hearing has
been conducted. Id. § 43.0685(b).
127. Id. § 43.0686(b).
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signatures then it must notify the residents and property owners of the area
and hold additional public hearings.128 Even if the municipality obtains
enough signatures from residents and landowners of the area proposed for
annexation, residents of the municipality can block the annexation.129
E. Tier 2 Municipality Annexation of an Area with a Population More Than 200
Subchapter C–5 of Local Government Code Chapter 43 provides the
authority and procedures for annexing areas with a population over 200.130
A tier 2 municipality may annex an area with a population greater than 200
only after holding an election in the proposed annexation area and obtaining
voter approval.131 If registered voters in the area being annexed do not
own more than half of the land, then a petition signed by more than 50%
of the landowners is required in addition to the election.132 Prior to the
election, the municipality must adopt a resolution pertaining to the
proposed annexation,133 mail notice of the proposed annexation to “each
property owner in the area[,]”134 and conduct public hearings.135
The annexing municipality must wait at least ninety days after adopting
the resolution to hold the election and shall pay all the costs.136 If property
owner consent is required, then petition signatures will be collected first,

128. Id. § 43.0686(c).
129. Id. § 43.0687. Municipality residents can lobby against the annexation by signing “a
petition protesting the annexation[.]” Id. If the petition has enough signatures from municipal
registered voters, then the annexation may not be complete until “approval of a majority of the voters
of the municipality voting at an election called and held for that purpose.” Id. (emphasis added).
130. Id. § 43.0691.
131. Id. §§ 43.069–.0691(1).
132. Id. § 43.0691(2).
133. Id. § 43.0692. The requirements are substantially similar to the resolution requirements
under Subchapter C-4: intent to annex, a map of the area, and a list and schedule of services to be
provided. Id. § 43.0682.
134. Id. § 43.0693. This requirement differs from the notice requirement under Subchapter C–
4 in that the municipality is only required to mail the notice to property owners and must also mention
the election. Cf. id. § 43.0683 (requiring notice of the public hearing, an explanation of the petition
period, and a list and schedule of services to be provided).
135. Id. § 43.0694. One public hearing must be held within twenty-one to thirty days after
adopting the resolution and an additional public hearing must be conducted within thirty-one to ninety
days after adopting the resolution. Id.
136. See id. § 43.0696(a)–(b) (stating the election will be “held on the first uniform election date
that falls on or after” either ninety days after the adoption of the resolution, or if consent of property
owners is required, then after seventy-eight days from the end of the petition period); see also TEX.
ELEC. CODE ANN. § 41.001 (setting uniform election dates).
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and an election will only occur if more than 50% of the owners approve the
annexation.137 If a majority of voters do not approve the annexation or if
the municipality does not obtain the requisite amount of signatures when a
petition is required, then the municipality is barred from proposing
annexation of the area for a year.138 If a majority of voters approve the
proposed annexation and the municipality collects the requisite amount of
signatures when a petition is required, then the municipality must notify
residents of the proposed area and hold additional public hearings.139 Even
if residents and property owners of the proposed area approve the
annexation, residents of the municipality can prevent the annexation.140
F. Exceptions to the Requirement of Consent
MARVA carved out specific instances when a tier 2 municipality may
annex an area without the consent of residents and owners.141 Cities
located in populous counties can annex enclaves within their ETJ without
obtaining consent.142 Other areas that a tier 2 municipality can
involuntarily annex include “industrial districts”;143 navigable streams

137. TEX. LOC. GOV’T §§ 43.0695(a), 43.0696(a)(2). The municipality has 180 days from the
adoption of the resolution to collect signatures but cannot begin collecting until after notice has been
mailed and the first public hearing is conducted. Id. § 43.0685(b).
138. Id. § 43.0697.
139. Id. § 43.0697(c).
140. See id. § 43.0698 (allowing residents of the municipality to lobby against the annexation by
signing “a petition protesting the annexation of an area”).
141. See Municipal Annexation Right to Vote Act, 85th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 6, §§ 4–9, secs. 43.026,
.027, .031, .035, .051, 2017 Tex. Gen. Laws 4505, 4506–08 (codified at TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE
§§ 43.011–.016) (creating a new subchapter to Chapter 43 of the Local Government Code which
applies to both tier 1 and tier 2 municipalities).
142. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN.§ 43.0115. This exception only applies when the annexing
city is located in a county with two or more cities each with a population over 300,000 and the area
proposed for annexation is “wholly surrounded by a municipality” and “has fewer than 100 dwelling
units.” Id. § 43.0115(a).
143. Id. § 43.0116. Industrial district is defined as “the meaning customarily given to the term
but also includes any area in which tourist-related businesses and facilities are located.” Id. § 42.044(a).
Municipalities may designate any area within its ETJ as an industrial district and can “treat the
designated area in a manner considered by the governing body to be in the best interests of the
municipality.” Id. § 42.044(b). Municipalities will enter into agreements with landowners within the
industrial district, which typically includes immunity from annexation for a specific time period. Id.
§ 42.044(c). This means that municipalities cannot involuntarily annex components of an industrial
district that are subject to immunity until after the contracts with landowners expire. Id. § 43.0116(b).
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adjacent to the municipality;144 and land that qualifies for agricultural use,
wildlife management use, or timber land.145
MARVA created a separate provision pertaining to annexing land
surrounding military bases.146 A municipality may annex the area
surrounding military bases that conduct active training programs.147 Tier 2
municipalities are still required to allow residents in the proposed annexation
area surrounding the military base to vote on the matter, but if the
annexation is not approved, the municipality will have “the authority to
adopt and enforce an ordinance regulating the land use in the area in the
manner recommended by the most recent joint land use study.”148
V. POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR CITIES AND THE STATE OF TEXAS
Supporters of property rights and the fight to end involuntary annexation
were victorious in the passing of MARVA.149 While the concerns of those
opposed to involuntary annexation are understandable,150 MARVA
disproportionately shifted the balance of power away from
municipalities.151 The following are areas of concern that cities and Texas
as a whole should be prepared for as a result of the new annexation laws.

144. Id. § 43.013; see also City of Nassau Bay v. Winograd, 582 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (explaining a city can regulate the land area around
an annexed stream for limited purposes but cannot exercise general regulatory powers).
145. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 43.016.
146. See id. § 43.0117 (defining “military base” as “a presently functioning federally owned or
operated military installation or facility”).
147. See id. § 43.0117(b) (“A municipality may annex . . . any part of the area located within five
miles of the boundary of a military base . . . .”).
148. Id.
149. See Alex Samuels & Shannon Najmabadi, Legislature Advances Annexation Bill to
Gov. Abbott, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/08/13/legislatureadvances-annexation-bill-gov-greg-abbott-consideration/ [https://perma.cc/9YUM-6GQK] (quoting
state Senator Donna Campbell as saying the municipal annexation bill “is a huge victory for property
rights of Texans”).
150. See Edwards, supra note 17, at 119 (“Annexation is often perceived as a process that strictly
benefits annexing cites at the expense of the annexed, as it may be pursued simply to enhance tax
base.”).
151. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS
LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 71 (2016) (recommending lawmakers create annexation legislation
that strikes “a balance of powers between property owners and municipalities to ensure the success of
[the] Texas economy”).
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A. Annexation in Populous Counties Will Significantly Decrease
Under the laws created by MARVA, municipal annexation in populous
counties152 is not likely to occur.153 Even if a municipality can get approval
to annex an area, it requires a costly process that city residents will have to
cover.154 Additionally, fringe communities that consent to annexation may
not be beneficial for the annexing municipality because the cost of the new
area may exceed the revenues generated by the annexed community.155
The inability to annex may lead to fragmentation within metropolitan

152. Tier 2 counties subject to strict annexation requirements include Harris, Dallas, Tarrant,
Bexar, Travis, Collin, Hidalgo, El Paso, Denton, Fort Bend, Montgomery, and Williamson.
Population Estimates for Texas Counties, 2010-2017, TEX. ST. LIBR. & ARCHIVES COMM’N,
https://www.tsl.texas.gov/ref/abouttx/popcnty201011.html
[https://perma.cc/R77Y-RBKS].
Although this only includes twelve of the 254 counties in Texas, these counties are home to more than
60% of Texas residents. See id. (reporting the estimated total population in 2016 for all counties with
more than 500,000 people as comprising of 63% of the total population of Texas). It is estimated that
the Dallas area will be the least effected by the amended law due to the land-locked nature of the
region. PERRYMAN GRP., supra note 12, at 19.
153. See Palmer & Lindsey, supra note 22, at 69 (“[A]nnexation occurs less often in states that
make annexation contingent upon approval by referendum or written consent of property owners or
residents in the territory to be annexed.”); see also Tyson, supra note 14, at 514 (explaining how approval
of annexation by residents or property owners of the area proposed for annexation is unlikely
considering that this puts “all power over boundary change in the hands of those of who may have
deliberately fled the central city and are therefore likely opposed to its expansion”). During the
November 2018 midterm elections, residents living in San Antonio’s ETJ around the Lackland and
Camp Bullis military bases voted on whether they wanted to be annexed for limited purposes. Iris
Dimmick, Residents of Military Buffer Zones to Vote on Annexation in November, RIVARD REP. (Aug. 2, 2018),
https://therivardreport.com/residents-of-military-buffer-zones-to-vote-on-annexation-in-november
/# [https://perma.cc/GZ89-8Y52]. The results were overwhelmingly against annexation. Van
Darden, Election Results: Charter Amendments, Annexation Results, KSAT (Nov. 7, 2018),
https://www.ksat.com/news/politics/election-results-charter-amendments-annexation-results
[https://perma.cc/G56F-2KXG] (reporting that 95% of voters in the Lackland area and 83% of voters
in the Camp Bullis area voted against annexation).
154. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 43.0696(b) (“The municipality shall pay for the costs
of holding the election.”); see also Cammack, supra note 24, at 642 (describing the various costs
associated with annexation elections). But see H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 6, 85th Leg.,
1st C.S., at 4 (2017) (claiming the costs associated with an annexation election “would be minimal and
easily recouped if annexation were successful”).
155. See, e.g., H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS
LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 52 (2016) (describing some of the issues associated with uncontrolled
development including “traffic issues, grid-lock, [and] right-away issues”). Annexing communities that
developed without regulatory controls in place will likely require financial resources to fix problems
which could have potentially been avoided. See Laurie Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers,
24 URB. LAW. 247, 249 (1992) (“[I]nvoluntary municipal annexation power is a preferable method of
ensuring orderly urban growth and equitable provision of municipal services.”).
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regions.156 Fragmentation is undesirable because it can reduce economic
competitiveness of a region,157 create socioeconomic segregation,158 and
influence other factors that negatively impact the economic development of
a region.159 Unincorporated communities protected from annexation by
the newly amended law may also experience increases in uncontrolled and
undesirable development, which can create infrastructure issues,160 affect
property values,161 and negatively impact the environment.162

156. See Tyson, supra note 16, at 348 (“The ability of a municipality to annex land within its
metropolitan region can be a key tool in limiting . . . municipal fragmentation . . . .”).
157. See JERRY PAYTAS, DOES GOVERNANCE MATTER? THE DYNAMICS OF METROPOLITAN
GOVERNANCE AND COMPETITIVENESS 22 (2001) (concluding “fragmented governance at the
metropolitan level reduces the competitiveness of the metropolitan economy”); see also Tyson, supra
note 14, at 531 (arguing that mid-size cities best way of competing on an international level is for the
entire region to work together).
158. See RUSK, supra note 11, at 2 (“[T]he more a region is broken up into multiple
governments . . . the more racially and economically segregated its housing market is . . . .”); John I.
Carruthers & Gudmundur F. Ulfarsson, Fragmentation and Sprawl: Evidence from Interregional Analysis,
33 GROWTH & CHANGE 312, 314–17 (2002) (describing how fragmentation contributes to urban
sprawl and can lead to socioeconomic segregation).
159. See Tyson, supra note 14, at 532 (“[S]tudies support the contention that fragmentation is
bad for metropolitan economic development efforts.”).
160. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS
LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 52 (2016) (reporting on “the ill effects when neighboring
municipalities do not annex such as uncontrolled traffic issues, grid-lock, right-away issues and not
having funding to pay roadways”).
161. See HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 37 (“[Z]oning grants a city the authority to prohibit
detrimental uses and to promote beneficial uses [of land] . . . thereby protecting the quality of life and
property values for residents.”); see also Joseph L. Sax, Why America Has a Property Rights Movement,
2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 513, 515 (2005) (acknowledging that unless early land-planning initiatives are
established to give property owners a clearer signal to what they can do with their land, early and late
developers will be treated differently in regards to what they are allowed to do with their land).
162. See Janice C. Griffith, Regional Governance Reconsidered, 21 J.L. & POL. 505, 512 (2005)
(“[S]uburban development has left few open spaces to absorb water runoff, to preserve habitat for
wildlife, or to provide green space for recreational use.”); CITY OF SAN ANTONIO,
REVIEW OF ANNEXATION FINANCIAL ANALYSIS AND BEST PRACTICES 10 (2016),
https://www.sanantonio.gov/Portals/0/Files/Planning/Annexation/PFM-Annexation-FinancialAnalysis-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QED-KRTB] (discussing how counties in Texas have limited
zoning powers which means municipal annexation is an “important regional tool to either incentivize or
disincentivize growth in a particular area, in order to accomplish broader regional goals such as . . .
environmental preservation” (emphasis added)). See, e.g., Edmond Ortiz, City Council Approves Southside
Annexation, RIVARD REP. (June 22, 2017), https://therivardreport.com/council-approves-southsideannexation/# [https://perma.cc/R3VE-S8W3] (reporting on the City of San Antonio annexing land
so as to put resource protections in an area near a river and around a nature preserve).
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B. Fiscal Health Concerns for Cities and Metropolitan Regions
Fringe communities benefit by living near municipalities.163 Some of
these benefits include employment with businesses located within the
city;164 access to public spaces; police and fire protection; and healthcare
services.165 When people utilize municipal funded public services without
contributing to the tax base,166 city resources become overly burdened.167
Involuntary annexation helps cities relieve these burdens,168 and thus the
inability to annex fringe communities creates a cap on municipal property
tax.169 Now that involuntary annexation is no longer available for Texas

163. See Reynolds, supra note 155, at 253 (acknowledging “perhaps [the] most compelling[ ]
interest advanced by the municipality is that annexation of the fringe would merely confirm the reality
that these developments are already a functional part of the city they surround”).
164. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS
LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 67 (2016) (quoting a study which shows that “80[%] of residents in
[San Antonio’s] ETJ, work within the city”); Edwards, supra note 17, at 121 (describing the process in
which city residents move away to the outlying areas of town but “may continue to work in the central
cities using municipal services and contributing to even higher city spending”). Many of these
companies decide to locate to a city or remain there due to economic development efforts funded by
city tax dollars. See HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 19 (explaining the beneficial economic impact
from tax dollars).
165. See H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 6, 85th Leg., 1st C.S., at 5 (2017) (noting
fringe residents “rely on infrastructure, cultural attractions, and other essentials that are built and
maintained by city tax revenue”); PERRYMAN GRP., supra note 12, at 4–5 (listing the services and
amenities that central cities often provide to the surrounding area such as “hospitals, universities,
cultural arts, sports facilities,” interstate highways, transit hubs, police and fire services, and parks and
recreation); Edwards, supra note 17, at 123 (“Municipal advocates also argue that fringe residents are
already enjoying urban services and urban infrastructure and not contributing to the finance of them.”).
166. This concept is sometimes referred to as “consumption without contribution.” H. COMM.
ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 55
(2016). It should be noted that fringe residents do contribute some economic benefits to the city. See
id. at 70 (recognizing that fringe residents contribute to city sales tax). However, fringe communities
do not contribute to the largest portion of city revenue: city property taxes. See HOW CITIES WORK,
supra note 5, at 8 (“Property taxes are the leading source of city revenue.”).
167. See Edwards, supra note 17, at 121 (maintaining that people living in fringe communities
and not attributing to city revenues “may lead to a situation of fiscal stress”).
168. See PERRYMAN GRP., supra note 12, at 2 (“Annexation expands the tax base, thus providing
funds to support an increasing regional population.”); Cammack, supra note 24, at 626 (“Unilateral
annexation allows municipalities at the heart of a metropolitan area to tax surrounding areas that have
benefited from the city’s services and growth, providing for the central city’s logical future growth.”).
169. Cf. Edwards, supra note 17, at 131 (portraying policy that prevents annexation as
“protect[ing] the desire of fringe residents to avoid municipal obligations, yet enjoy municipal
benefits”); Reynolds, supra note 155, at 266 (“[N]onresidents on the fringe should no more have the
power to opt out of the responsibilities of urban life than should city residents be able to claim an
exemption from taxes to support services they do not use.”).
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cities in populous counties, financial burdens must be relieved elsewhere.170
Cities in populous counties are now forced to focus on methods other
than annexation to increase revenues.171 Municipalities can increase their
tax base within the city by utilizing economic development strategies to
attract new businesses and residents.172 While these tactics are already used
in larger cities,173 most economic development tools are improbable
options for mid-size cities, thus making them the most likely to be negatively
affected by the reformed laws.174 Municipalities will likely increase taxes
on residents living within the city at a rate higher than they otherwise would
have,175 which further exacerbates the disproportion in contributions
between city residents and fringe residents.176 An increasing tax burden on
city residents can lead to more people fleeing to the fringe, thereby adding
more to the city’s problems and a continuation of this cycle.177 Migration
170. See PERRYMAN GRP., supra note 12, at 1–2 (stressing concerns about the prosperity of
central cities in metropolitan statistical areas if there are not enough sources of revenue to support
growing demands).
171. See generally TEX. MUN. LEAGUE, REVENUE MANUAL FOR TEXAS CITIES (2017),
https://www.tml.org/p/2017revenuemanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV7E-4V6P] (detailing the
various revenue options for Texas cities).
172. See TEX. MUN. LEAGUE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK 1–5, 42, 80–127 (Bill
Longley ed., 2017), https://www.tml.org/p/2017EconomicDevelopmentHandbook_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2CKK-T5G5] (exploring economic development incentives available to Texas
cities including economic development sales tax, venue project tax, and property tax incentives);
RICHARD M. HAUGHEY, URBAN LAND INST., HIGHER-DENSITY DEVELOPMENT: MYTH AND FACT
6 (2005), http://uli.org/wp-content/uploads/ULI-Documents/HigherDensity_MythFact.ashx_.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CAN4-YJUD] (noting a growing demand in America for “higher-density housing
in mixed-density communities . . . over single-family houses far from the community core”).
173. See HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 19 (“[L]arger cities have partnered with the state
to attract such major developments as a Texas Instruments facility and a Toyota plant.”).
174. See Tyson, supra note 14, at 521 (stating mid-size metropolitan regions have a hard time
being economically competitive because “they lack the image, economic and population diversity, and
the real and perceived quality of life advantages that large urban regions have in abundance); HOW
CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 19 (“Smaller [Texas] cities are usually on their own to attract business.”).
175. See Griffith, supra note 162, at 512–13 (“As central cities . . . continue to maintain and
operate many facilities used by the region as a whole, they must raise taxes upon their own residents,
making the inner city even less affordable . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Raymond & Menifield, supra
note 2, at 417 (reporting the results of a study that indicate cities unable to expand their boundaries
have the highest taxes).
176. Cf. Reynolds, supra note 155, at 266 (describing the movement against annexation as
favoring the interests of a few over the interests of all residents in the region).
177. See PERRYMAN GRP., supra note 12, at 21 (describing the cycle when cities cannot meet
their financial burdens, “The result is perpetual deterioration on the sustainability of the core of the
area, which in turn accelerates flight to outlying areas.”). The following cities help illustrate this
concern:
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out of the city is especially concerning when one considers that historically
most people who flee to the suburbs are wealthy and middle-class families
leaving behind a poorer tax base.178 In addition to increasing revenues,
cities may also be forced to reduce their spending on public services.179
Poorly funded public services can make a municipality undesirable to its
residents180 and can hamper the city’s ability to attract new companies and
residents.181
The fiscal issues that municipalities may experience due to annexation
reform are not only concerning to cities but also to the entire metropolitan
region. Neighboring communities benefit from their proximity to central
cities.182 This means if the central city suffers, so do the suburbs and the
In 1950, Detroit, Baltimore, Cleveland, and St. Louis were the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth
largest cities in the nation in population. All four of them were prevented from expanding their
city limits. Sixty years later, in 2010, all four cities had about the same number of square miles
they had in 1950.
HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 35. Current data places Detroit, Baltimore, Cleveland, and St.
Louis as twenty-third, thirtieth, fifty-first, and sixty-second in the nation in population. City and Town
Population Totals: 2010–2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/
tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk [https://perma.cc/C2T8-4HF8].
178. See Raymond & Menifield, supra note 2, at 405 (claiming “the exit of former middle and
upper-class city inhabitants who have since moved beyond the outer reaches of the city” as being
largely responsible for the depleting tax bases in metropolitan areas); Tyson, supra note 14, at 516
(asserting the “initial wave of white flight and a subsequent wave of [multiracial] middle class flight . . .
has decimated the tax base . . . of metropolitan region central cities”).
179. See PERRYMAN GRP., supra note 12, at 5 (“Without the capacity to annex . . . growing areas
and increase its tax base, a city will face potentially insurmountable fiscal challenges.”). Texas
municipalities spend more on public services than the state and provide police, fire and EMS,
infrastructure, parks and recreations, libraries, and other services. HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5,
at 7–9 (2017).
180. See PERRYMAN GRP., supra note 12, at 21 (describing the diminishing quality of urban
centers as tarnishing the image of the region and reducing retention).
181. See H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 6, 85th Leg., 1st C.S., at 5 (2017) (predicting
involuntary annexation reform “could threaten essential economic development incentives funded and
offered by cities, which are key to staying competitive with other states and attracting businesses and
new residents to Texas”); PERRYMAN GRP., supra note 12, at 21 (stressing a deteriorating city has
reduced “prospects for business locations [and] expansions”).
182. See H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 6, 85th Leg., 1st C.S., at 5 (2017) (noting
fringe residents “rely on infrastructure, cultural attractions, and other essentials that are built and
maintained by city tax revenue”); H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH
TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 67 (2016) (relaying testimony pertaining to a study which
shows that a majority of residents in San Antonio’s ETJ, work within San Antonio); PERRYMAN GRP.,
supra note 12, at 4 (listing the services and amenities that central cities often provide to the surrounding
area such as hospitals, universities, cultural arts, sports facilities, interstate highways, transit hubs, police
and fire services, and parks and recreation).
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entire metropolitan region.183 To offset the potential negative impacts of
annexation reform, communities within metropolitan regions have to work
collectively to attract new businesses184 and manage growth.185 Counties
may also have to take on a larger governance role,186 although this would
require significant legislative efforts.187
C. Statewide Fiscal Concerns
The inability to annex is not only a concern for the cities and regions
affected by the reformed law but also the entire state.188 Texas relies heavily
on the economic prosperity of its cities. Unlike the majority of states in the
United States, there is no state income tax in Texas.189 This means revenue
to pay for public services must come from other sources. While the state
does have sources of revenue,190 Texas municipalities actually pay for a
majority of public services.191 All states rely to some degree on local

183. See PERRYMAN GRP., supra note 12, at 1–3, 5 (implying fringe communities will be
negatively affected by a deteriorating city center).
184. See, e.g., Paul Bell & Eric Bell, Opinion, Amazon: Choose San Austin, RIVARD REP. (Sept. 16,
2017), https://therivardreport.com/amazon-choose-san-austin/ [https://perma.cc/DKJ4-YVLZ]
(encouraging city leaders of the neighboring cities Austin and San Antonio to collectively propose a
regional bid to Amazon).
185. See Griffith, supra note 162, at 517 (describing “smart growth” practices available to regions
to help counter sprawl).
186. See Raymond & Menifield, supra note 2, at 415–16 (discussing city-county consolidation as
an alternative way to counter deteriorating effects of suburban flight); ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
HANDBOOK, supra note 172, at 170–73 (reviewing city-county cooperative efforts).
187. See RUSK, supra note 11, at 12 (“State legislatures should mandate regional tax-base-sharing
programs . . . .”); Kristen Clarke, Voting Rights & City-County Consolidations, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 626
(2006) (describing the rarity of referendums for city-county consolidation being approved by voters).
See generally id., for a further discussion of city-county consolidation.
188. See Houston, supra note 49, at 353 (alleging “eroding annexation authority would be an
economic disaster for the State of Texas”).
189. See Nicole Kaeding, State Individual Income Tax Rates and Brackets for 2016, TAX FOUND.
(Feb. 8, 2016), https://taxfoundation.org/state-individual-income-tax-rates-and-brackets-2016/
[https://perma.cc/5YSQ-8AAY] (reporting Texas as one of only seven states that did not have a state
income tax in 2016).
190. Sources of state revenue in Texas include federal funds, sales tax and other state taxes such
as cigarettes, motor vehicle, motor fuel, and franchise. Eva DeLuna Castro & Dick Lavine, Ctr. for
Pub. Pol’y Priorities, How Texas Spends its Money. How Texas Gets its Money. Why it Doesn’t Add Up.,
RIVARD REP. (Feb. 27, 2013), https://therivardreport.com/how-texas-spends-its-money-how-texasgets-its-money-why-it-doesnt-add-up/ [https://perma.cc/NTA4-UTLY].
191. See id. (“Texas’[s] local governments provided $90 billion in public services in 2009,
compared to $59 billion from the Texas state budget.”). Texas cities have paid more than the state for
public services for over a decade. See id. (“Local taxes have provided the majority of state and local
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governments to provide various public services, but most states grant
financial aid192 to cities to assist in the cost of these services.193 This is not
the case in Texas where municipalities receive virtually no state aid194 and
instead contribute funding to the state.195 Texas municipalities are
“compelled to share city-generated revenue with the state[.]”196 Examples
of Texas cities transferring revenues to the state include administrative fees
paid to the state for collecting and processing sales tax,197 local participation
in state highway projects,198 costs associated with municipal courts
collecting state fees,199 and Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
fees.200 While the exact amount of money paid by cities to the State of

taxes for public services in every year since 2002, peaking at a [56%] share of state and local taxes in
2010.”).
192. State aid is “a grant made by the state to cities from revenue generated by the state[.]”
HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 14.
193. See CHRISTIANA K. MCFARLAND & CHRISTOPHER W. HOENE, NAT’L LEAGUE OF
CITIES, CITIES AND STATE FISCAL STRUCTURE: 2015, at 20 (2015), http://www.nlc.org/sites/
default/files/2017-02/NLC_CSFS_Report_WEB.PDF [https://perma.cc/YL3L-7KTN] (listing the
percentage of municipal general revenue that comes from state aid for each state in the United States).
194. See id. at 21 (reporting that only 4% of general revenue for the average Texas city comes
from state aid as compared to the United States average of 18%). Only Georgia, Oklahoma, and West
Virginia receive a smaller percentage than Texas cities. Id.
195. See HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 14–16 (describing the “numerous ways in which
cities transfer revenue to the state”).
196. Id. at 14.
197. Id. Revenues from sales tax are transferred to the state in the following manner:
When a Texan purchases a product that is subject to the state and local sales tax, the merchant
collects the entire tax due and remits it to the state comptroller. The comptroller, in turn, remits
the local share back to the appropriate local government (city, metropolitan transit authority,
county, and/or special district). For providing this service and for performing other
administrative, enforcement, and reporting duties, the comptroller deducts two percent of the
local share of the sales tax and deposits that amount in the state’s general revenue fund.
The two percent fee is high compared to the same fee in other states. . . . A [Texas Municipal
League] committee . . . estimate[d] the cost of collection to the state. The committee’s estimate
was at most $27.7 million per year, far less than the $107 million paid by cities, [thereby] generating
a “profit” of more than $79 million to the state.
Id.
198. See id. at 14–15 (explaining an increase in state highway project costs being shared with
local governments in response to a request from the Texas Department of Transportation).
199. Id. at 15 (claiming reimbursements to municipalities to cover the administrative cost of
collecting state fees are not enough and that increasingly more of the overall fees collected by municipal
courts are going to the state and less to the municipality).
200. See Houston, supra note 49, at 334–35 (asserting the Texas Commission on Environmental
Quality is largely funded by local governments).
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Texas is unclear, the Texas Municipal League has estimated it to be over
$250 million per year.201
Not having a state income tax, giving virtually no state aid to cities, and
sharing city revenues with the state creates a substantial dependence and
burden on Texas cities.202 The average Texas municipality has an array of
revenue sources203 but relies heavily on property taxes.204 Although
property taxes are higher in Texas than the average state,205 Texans pay one
of the lowest overall tax rates.206 Furthermore, even though municipalities
significantly depend on property taxes, only 16% of property taxes paid in
Texas go to cities.207 Despite all the financial pressure on municipalities,
state lawmakers continue to support and pass legislation that chips away at
local government’s ability to collect property taxes.208 Decisions in recent
years to cap property tax have resulted in a massive state deficit209 and a
severely underfunded school finance system.210 The reformed annexation
laws created by MARVA place additional limits on cities ability to collect

201. HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 16.
202. See id. at 7 (summarizing a National League of Cities report establishing “the State of Texas
relies very heavily on Texas cities to generate the revenue necessary for municipal facilities and
services”).
203. Sources of revenues that make up Texas municipal general funds include sales tax, rightof-way rentals, permit fees, and court fines. Id. at 8–9.
204. See DeLuna Castro & Lavine, supra note 190 (“Local property taxes are the primary source
of revenue for local governments (school districts, cities, counties, and special districts like community
colleges).”). Recent estimates show property tax as accounting for 34% of Texas cities’ general fund
revenues. HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 8.
205. See DeLuna Castro & Lavine, supra note 190 (ranking Texas as having the sixteenth highest
local tax bill and the fourteenth highest property taxes per capita).
206. See HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 11 (ranking Texas as “[forty-sixth] in the amount
of combined state and local taxes paid by residents”).
207. See id. at 6 (presenting property tax distribution data published by the Texas Comptroller’s
Biennial Property Tax report).
208. See Tex. S.B. 2, 85th Leg., R.S. 45 (2017) (proposing a 4% cap on city property tax
increases); DeLuna Castro & Lavine, supra note 190 (reporting the Texas Legislature in 2006 “requir[ed]
school districts to reduce their school property tax rates by one-third”).
209. The Center for Public Policy Priorities estimates the deficit to be around $10 billion for
each biennium since 2006. DeLuna Castro & Lavine, supra note 190.
210. See HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 7 (“[P]ublic schools . . . rely almost exclusively on
the property tax . . . .”); DeLuna Castro & Lavine, supra note 190 (asserting the deficit forced the
legislature “to make cuts to education that have severely damaged our ability to prepare our kids for
the future”). It has been estimated that “[o]ver the last two decades, if state and local taxes had merely
been held constant . . . the [l]egislature would have had tens of billions of additional dollars to invest
in children.” Id.
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property taxes211 and thereby have the potential to further exacerbate this
deficit.212 In a state that already pays one of the lowest tax rates in the
United States, should lawmakers be supporting legislation that continues to
lower it even more?213 This is especially concerning when coupled with the
$10 billion deficit and the fact that Texas is a low-spending state.214 While
annexation reform alone is not likely to completely jeopardize Texas’s
economy,215 continued legislation reducing municipal authority may slowly
erode away at the economic success of Texas.216
VI. CONCLUSION
The passing of MARVA was a clear victory for the property rights
movement.217 Supporters of MARVA fought against involuntary
annexation maintaining that it is not fair to force people into the city limits
without their consent.218 While this is a legitimate concern, their argument
fails to take into account the benefits of living close to a city.219 City
resources are drained when fringe communities receive benefits provided by
211. MARVA essentially creates a cap on property taxes by preventing municipalities from
taxing fringe residents that regularly consume benefits provided by the city. Cf. MCFARLAND &
HOENE, supra note 193, at 11 (“[S]tate and local tax systems are constrained in significant ways . . .
through voter- or state-imposed . . . tax and expenditure limitations . . . .”).
212. Cf. DeLuna Castro & Lavine, supra note 190 (“[The] $10 billion hole will appear in every
state budget until the Legislature fills it with additional revenue.”).
213. See HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 16 (“It’s easy to grasp why some state legislators
are tempted to turn to cities and ask them to generate revenue for the state. It’s much harder to
understand why some of those same legislators have been trying for several years to limit the revenuegenerating capacity of cities by placing caps on the municipal property tax.”).
214. See DeLuna Castro & Lavine, supra note 190 (“Texas is [forty-third] on direct general
spending per capita, for state and local government.”).
215. But see PERRYMAN GRP., supra note 12, at 21–22 (predicting involuntary annexation reform
will cost the State of Texas “$305.7 billion in yearly gross product, $168.8 billion in annual personal
income, and 1,234,760 permanent jobs” over a thirty-year period).
216. See MCFARLAND & HOENE, supra note 193, at 2 (“To ensure economic vitality, state fiscal
systems should provide sufficient fiscal autonomy for localities to fund their share of resident needs.”);
see also RUSK, supra note 11, at 11 (“State legislatures should have a vital interest in ensuring the fiscal
viability of their state’s municipalities, particularly their major cities.”).
217. See Samuels & Najmabadi, supra note 149 (quoting Texas Senator Donna Campbell as
saying the new law “is a huge victory for property rights of Texans”).
218. See, e.g., FIELDS & QUINTERO, supra note 45, at 10 (criticizing involuntary annexation as
“an unjust exercise of government power”).
219. See H. Comm. on Land & Res. Mgmt., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 6, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017)
(“[T]he vast majority of those who live just outside city limits commute into the city and rely on
infrastructure, cultural attractions, and other essentials that are built and maintained by city tax
revenue.”).
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municipalities but do not contribute their fair amount of taxes.220
Annexation allowed Texas cities to relieve the burdens created by the fringe
communities.221
MARVA shields fringe community property owners from paying for
benefits they receive from the city and therefore creates a cap on
municipalities’ ability to tax222 and leaves cities to find other ways to relieve
their financial problems.223 The fiscal health of Texas cities is crucial to the
economic strength of the entire state.224 For over a decade, local
governments have contributed more to public services than the State of
Texas225 and with almost no state aid.226 If Texas is going to continue to
heavily depend on local governments, it should be giving cities more tools
instead of taking them away.
While it is unlikely that the new annexation laws will completely
jeopardize Texas’s economy, legislation that continues to restrict municipal
authority may collectively harm the future economic success of Texas and
should not be supported by state lawmakers. “That being said, and in spite
of the legislature’s confusing, continued efforts to harm the state’s economic
engines, city officials in Texas are resilient and will find innovative ways to
keep the Texas miracle alive.”227

220. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS
LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 55 (2016) (testimony of the City Manager for the City of Rockport
describing city benefits received by fringe residents as “consumption without contribution”).
221. See Edwards, supra note 17, at 121 (“[A]nnexation has been pursued to offset the fiscal
implications of the migration of middle- and upper-income people fleeing central cities, which may
lead to a situation of fiscal stress.”); see also H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO
THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 54 (2016) (quoting the Mayor for the City of Frisco
as saying: “The reason behind forced annexation is to protect the public good.”).
222. See Edwards, supra note 17, at 131 (asserting annexation reform “protects the desire of
fringe residents to avoid municipal obligations, yet enjoy municipal benefits”).
223. See generally REVENUE MANUAL FOR TEXAS CITIES, supra note 171 (listing the various ways
Texas cities can generate revenues).
224. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS
LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 43 (2016) (“The State relies heavily on municipalities to create . . .
stable environments for the growing population all the while enhancing the economic growth.”).
225. See DeLuna Castro & Lavine, supra note 190 (“Local taxes have provided the majority of
state and local taxes for public services in every year since 2002 . . . .”).
226. See MCFARLAND & HOENE, supra note 193, at 21 (reporting how only 4% of Texas cities’
general revenue comes from state aid).
227. TEX. MUN. LEAGUE, HOME RULE CITIES TAKE HEED: ANNEXATION REFORM
EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 1 (2017), https://www.tml.org/legis_updates/home-rule-cities-take-heedannexation-reform-effective-december-1 [https://perma.cc/5XMJ-5BGL].
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